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Abstract
We examine the optimal regulation of agricultural markets when farmers
have organized their activity in a cooperative which is the monopoly supplier
of an upstream product and which competes with a single rival ￿rm in sell-
ing a homogenous downstream product. The rival￿ s marginal cost is private
information and therefore the rival expects to earn an information rent.
We show that the optimal access price discriminates against the private
rival because rent is more valuable in the cooperative than in the private
￿rm, and the regulator therefore sacri￿ces some cost e¢ ciency in order to
shift rents. Thus, while competition will bene￿t farmers, consumers and tax
payers, the extent of competition should optimally be somewhat limited.
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11 Introduction
For various reasons, most developed countries support their domestic agriculture. In
addition to direct government support, farmer-owned marketing cooperatives have
been allowed to operate as cartels to increase the farmers￿market revenues. The
historical-political background for this way of organizing the industry is the farm
bankruptcy crisis in the 1930s. Weak farmers wanted control over a larger part of
the value chain in order to avoid being exploited by strong food-processing ￿rms,
and the political climate was ready to grant farmers this control.1
Today, the marketing cooperatives￿combined market shares in the farm input
market vary by country and by food category, and are generally highest in the
northern European countries and in the dairy sector. At one extreme is the dairy
sector in the Nordic countries in which a few marketing cooperatives with limited
geographical overlap have a combined market share of more than 90 percent. But
also in countries like the Netherlands and Germany, individual dairy cooperatives
might enjoy considerable market power as a result of their market position.2
Although there is no doubt that the powerful cooperatives have contributed to
a wanted increase in the farmers￿incomes, the lack of competition might lead us to
worry that some big cooperatives lack incentives to run their activities e¢ ciently. By
being shielded from competition, the cooperatives may for instance have too weak
incentives to innovate by introducing new products or new cost-saving processes.
1The e¢ cient scale in farming is much smaller than in the food-processing industry. Thus,
individual farmers risk being exploited if their products are purchased by investor-owned corpo-
rates. This is because of the large amount of capital tied up in farm equipment, and because
there may only be one potential buyer in the relevant market. One way of avoiding this is to
form cooperatives. See, e.g., Rogers and Sexton (1994) for a discussion of the arguments for co-
operatives. Another rationale for agricultural cooperatives is given by Bogetoft (2005). He argues
that when farmers have private information about their cost conditions, a cooperative may un-
der certain circumstances be the socially optimal organization. Buccirossi, Marette and Schiavina
(2002) provides evidence for farmers being the weakest link of the entire chain, given the degree of
concentration in the upstream and downstream industries in Europe.
2See Bergman (1997) for a detailed study of agricultural cooperatives in selected European
countries and the US.
2Since the 1980s we have seen growing political interest in exposing agricultural co-
operatives to competition, and these markets have been somewhat opened up in
recent years. In the Norwegian milk sector, for instance, some degree of competition
has been achieved in two ways: besides selling their milk to the national milk co-
operative, dairymen can now sell their milk to independent processors/distributors.
And the national milk cooperative, in addition to processing and distributing the
milk and milk products, is now required to also sell raw milk to independent proces-
sors/distributors which do not have any dairymen under contract. The latter situ-
ation is the topic of this paper.
We examine the optimal regulation of agricultural markets when the farmers
have organized their activity in a cooperative which is the monopoly supplier of an
upstream product (say, raw milk) and which competes with a single rival ￿rm in
selling a homogenous downstream product (say, cheese). The rival￿ s costs are private
information and because of this information asymmetry, the rival expects to earn an
information rent. We assume that a fully deregulated market would result in too few
farms from a social perspective, primarily because agricultural activities are associ-
ated with positive externalities such as food security and landscape preservation.3
The regulator controls three instruments: the lump-sum transfer to the farms, the
access price and the upstream production quota. The regulator￿ s problem is thus
partly an access pricing problem and partly a question of striking the right balance
between funding the farmers by direct transfers or by raising prices.
The policy instruments included in our model are consistent with the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP) in the EU. The consumer prices are maintained at a high
level using intervention prices and export subsidies, and, for the dairy sector, by
restricting aggregate production using farm-level production quotas. Also, since the
CAP reform in 2003, the bulk of direct payments is not coupled to production but
given as a single farm payment. However, it is expected that further reforms of the
CAP will result in reduced price support and a quota abolition.
We present two ￿ndings. First, we show that exposing the monopoly cooperative
to competition will bene￿t farmers, consumers and tax payers, which is perhaps
3See e.g. Brunstad et al (2005) for an examination of multifunctionality of agriculture.
3not very surprising. The possibility of a more e¢ cient rival ￿rm￿ s entering the
marketplace brings the expected downstream costs down. Consequently, the optimal
total quota increases and the optimal number of farmers increases. This latter result
is a consequence of, as we assume, increasing variable unit costs at the farm level.4
Second ￿ and more importantly ￿ we show that the optimal access price dis-
criminates against the rival ￿rm because the regulator optimally trades o⁄some cost
e¢ ciency (which calls for a non-discriminatory access price) to reduce the socially
costly transfer to the farms (which calls for a discriminatory access price). Thus,
we argue that while it is optimal to expose the monopoly cooperative to increased
competition downstream, the extent of such competition should under certain cir-
cumstances be somewhat limited.
We study the e⁄ects of competition in a model in which there is only one potential
rival. In the concluding section we discuss alternative descriptions and argue that
our discrimination result may hold also with more competition among rivals, while
it disappears if the rivals compete away all rent.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we give a brief presentation of
access price theory and show how our model relates to this strand of literature. In
section 3, we describe the formal model. In section 4 and 5, we solve the regulator￿ s
optimization problem assuming information symmetry and information asymmetry,
respectively. In section 6, we present our conclusions.
2 Access price theory
The problem of one-way access pricing has been addressed by many economists,5
and some of them have, like we have, examined how asymmetries in the market and
lack of regulatory tools result in the need for asymmetric access pricing￿ that is,
4The increasing variable unit cost may be due to for example limited productive land, the need
to invest in new capital as the farm grows, limitations on the number of cattle set by the authorities
to prevent diseases from spreading or other diseconomies of scale. Consequently, for each upstream
product quota, there exists a unique number of farms which minimizes the aggregate farm level
costs￿ and vice versa.
5See Armstrong and Sappington (2005) for an overview on access pricing.
4setting the access price above or below the level that gives an entrant access on equal
terms. However, in both the academic and political debate, the emphasis has clearly
been on the need to subsidize access prices to counteract the impact of imperfect
downstream competition or to induce entry.
Ideally, when public funds are socially costly, the optimal prices for a regulated
￿rm are Ramsey prices. And the access price should, like the monopolist￿ s retail
price, participate in the coverage of the ￿xed cost. In real life, regulators are often
advised to secure supply on equal terms to downstream competitors. That is, the
terms of access should ensure that a rival producer of the downstream product can
enter the market if and only if that producer is at least as e¢ cient as the monopolist.
This is the logic behind the in￿ uential E¢ cient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR)
which was ￿rst proposed by Willig (1979).6
La⁄ont and Tirole (2000) show that the ECPR will be consistent with optimal
Ramsey prices under the following full symmetry assumptions: symmetric costs of
providing access; demand symmetry in the downstream market; cost symmetry in
the downstream market; and, absence of market power for the rival ￿rm.
One important deviation from ECPR occurs when the rival ￿rm possesses market
power and charges a price for its downstream product which exceeds the socially
optimal price.7 Ideally, if entry is socially desirable, the regulator should use a lump-
sum transfer (tax or subsidy) to bring the rival ￿rm￿ s rent to the right level, and set
the access price so as to obtain the right Ramsey prices downstream. That is, the
access price should be subsidized so as to o⁄set the excessive mark-up imposed by
the competitor. This result is shown in La⁄ont and Tirole (2000) under information
symmetry and in Lewis and Sappington (1999) in a situation in which the single
6See Baumol (1983), Baumol (1993), Baumol and Sidak (1994a, 1994b), and Armstrong (2002,
section 2.3.1) for a further discussion of the ECPR.
7Other deviations from the ECPR are examined by La⁄ont and Tirole (1994) and Economides
and White (1995) who show that if the monopoly (rival ￿rm) has captive customers or is more cost
e¢ cient, the ECPR may give a too high (low) access price. Other contributions worth mentioning
are: Economides and White (1998), Larson and Lehman (1997), La⁄ont, Rey and Tirole (1998),
Larson (1998) and Armstrong and Vickers (1998).
5entrant possesses private information on its marginal cost.8
Our analysis is perhaps most closely related to that of Lewis and Sappington
(1999). Like them we consider a situation in which the regulator does not know
the marginal cost of the singel rival ￿rm and in which the access price is set so as
to balance con￿ icting goals. However, in our setting the products are homogenous
and the downstream market is regulated; so, there is no need to subsidize the access
price. Rather, the access price in our model should be set so as to balance cost-
e¢ cient entry and rent extraction. Thus, we reach the opposite result to Lewis and
Sappington: the access price should be set so as to discriminate against the rival.
It might seem that providing the regulator with another instrument would alter
the conclusion in our paper. In Lewis and Sappington￿ s paper the regulator o⁄ers
the rival a two-part access tari⁄: a lump-sum fee and a unit charge; the regulator
uses the lump-sum fee to extract the rival￿ s rent, and uses the unit charge to obtain
the right prices of the two di⁄erentiated products. In our setting, with homogenous
products, both parts of the tari⁄would only a⁄ect the rival￿ s entry decision but not
the Ramsey price on the downstream product. Thus, it would still be optimal to set
the terms of access so that they discriminate against the rival in a trade-o⁄between
cost-e¢ ciency and rent extraction.
3 The model
Consider an agricultural sector with N identical risk neutral farmers that produce
a total quantity x of an upstream product (say, raw milk). Their aggregate cost is
given by
C = C(N;x), (1)
8An interesting observation made by Economides and White (1998) is "If the conditions under
which the ECPR would be e¢ cient are present, its application is redundant; if they are absent, its
application would be a mistake (as compared with a more optimal Ramsey rule).￿
6which is twice di⁄erentiable, increasing in x and convex.9 Moreover, it is reasonable
to assume that CNx < 0, while C may be increasing or decreasing in N, depending
on the level of production x: we assume that CN < 0 for low N and CN > 0 for
high N.10
The farmers have organized their marketing activity in a cooperative which is
the monopoly supplier of the upstream product and which competes with a single
rival ￿rm in selling a homogenous downstream product (say, cheese).11 The inverse
consumer demand function is given by p = p(x). Downstream production can be
undertaken by the cooperative, a private rival, or a combination. We refer to the
cooperative as ￿rm 1 and the rival as ￿rm 2. For simplicity, we assume constant
returns to scale: constant marginal costs and no ￿xed costs. Moreover, units are
normalized in the sense that it takes one unit of the upstream product to produce
one unit of the downstream product. The downstream production cost functions
are given by:
C1 = (a + b)x1 (2)
C2 = (￿ + ￿)x2 (3)
where x1 and x2 are the respective production volumes (x = x1 + x2); a and ￿ are
the prices of the upstream product; and b and ￿ are the downstream marginal costs.
Thus, ￿ is the access price on the upstream product controlled by the cooperative,
while a is the internal transfer price between the farmers and the cooperative.
We will abstract from principal-agent problems between the farmers and the
cooperative, thereby assuming that farms￿income from the market is equal to their
payment for the upstream products plus the cooperative￿ s net pro￿t. In addition, the
farms receive a lump-sum transfer from the government. Without loss of generality,
we can then impose a break-even constraint on the cooperative, thereby pinning
9That is, Cx > 0, Cxx > 0, CNN > 0 and CxxCNN > (CNx)2, where subscripts denote partial
derivatives.
10See Linnerud and Vagstad (2008) for a more detailed description of an agricultural sector
satisfying these assumptions.
11This demand function is assumed to satisfy the usual regularity conditions p0(x) < 0 and
2p0(x) + xp00(x) < 0.
7down the transfer price a = p(x) ￿ b. The rival ￿rm￿ s pro￿t ￿ is given by
￿ = (p ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)x2. (4)
There is free entry and exit of farmers, implying that any farmer￿ s rent will be
dissipated. The government maximizes a social welfare function given by
W = V (N) + CS + ￿ ￿ (1 + ￿)T (5)




p(z)dz ￿ xp(x) is the consumers￿surplus, and the social costs of the
transfers T are given by (1 + ￿)T due to distortive taxation. V is assumed to be
increasing and concave.




and d[F (￿)=f (￿)]=d￿ > 0. The last condition is known as the monotone hazard
rate condition, and is satis￿ed by most commonly used distributions.12 Furthermore,






￿ ￿ p ￿ ￿ (6)
denote the margin left to the rival to cover its downstream marginal cost ￿. Since
the products are homogenous, the access price will only determine whether the rival
enters the market and not how much it chooses to process. Thus, the determination
of the access price, ￿, and the margin, ￿
￿, are equivalent, and we will focus on the
latter in the following. Note that the rival is secured access on equal terms according
to ECPR when ￿
￿ = b and is discriminated against when ￿
￿ < b.
The timing in the model is as follows:
1. The rival ￿rm learns its downstream marginal cost ￿.
2. The regulator sets the values of x, ￿
￿ and T.13
12The monotone hazard rate condition is satis￿ed by the following distributions: uniform, nor-
mal, logistic, chi-quared, exponential and Laplace. See Bagnoli and Bergstr￿m (1989) for a more
complete list.
13The social welfare loss stemming from information asymmetry could be reduced by
83. The number of farmers is adjusted (by entry and exit) until the remaining
active farmers expect to break even.
4. The cooperative buys a quantity x=N from each farm.










6. The cooperative processes the residual supply, x1 = x ￿ x2.
The downstream decision rules at steps 5 and 6 may appear unnatural. However,
the rival will not enter unless ￿ ￿ ￿
￿, and it can be intuitively understood that it
does not make any sense for the regulator to set ￿
￿ > b. If so, then the rival
is favored in the sense that entry is encouraged even if the rival has a small cost
disadvantage. Increasing the access charge will then lead to increased cost e¢ ciency
as well as shifting rent from the rival to the cooperative. Both these e⁄ects are
wanted. Consequently, in any equilibrium it must be the case that ￿
￿ < b; with
strict inequality due to the desirability of rent shifting for ￿ > 0. If the rival enters,
the cooperative will be better o⁄ (by an amount equal to b ￿ ￿
￿ > 0 per unit)
letting the rival produce the downstream product. If, the rival ￿rm does not enter,
the cooperative will be better o⁄ producing the downstream product than choosing
not to, as long as b < p. Therefore steps 5 and 6 describe the outcome of pro￿t
maximizing strategies for the rival and the cooperative, respectively.
The farmers￿decision rule is described at step 3. A potential farmer observes
the terms set by the regulator and chooses to enter (and join the cooperative) if
the expected rent is non-negative.14 For a given x, T and ￿
￿, the expected rent
alternatively using a screening technique: The rival chooses from a menu of contracts
fx(￿);￿
￿ (￿);T (￿)g; the contracts are designed so that it is optimal for the rival to reveal its
true marginal cost ￿. The solution to this optimization problem is given in Linnerud and Vagstad
(2008). Since the screening technique requires a contract between the regulator and the unregulated
downstream competitor, it seems less political feasible.
14This decision rule implies that the farmers have an outside opportunity with a rent equal to
zero.
9of the farms is a function of the number of farms. If the expected rent is positive
(negative), the farmers will enter (exit) until the expected rent equals zero - which
as a result of the regulator￿ s choice of transfer, T, secures an optimal number of
farms.15
Uncertainty about the rival￿ s cost, ￿, will lead to uncertainty about farmers
market revenues. It may seem unrealistic to assume that the entry/exit decisions of
farmers will not be revised when the farmers observe the entry decision of the rival at
step 5. Note, however, that the outcome of the model would not be altered if at step 2
the regulator announced the optimal number of farms, N, promising that the transfer
would equal C(x;N) ￿ (￿ ￿ a)x if the rival entered and C(x;N) ￿ (p ￿ b ￿ a)x if
it did not.
The regulator￿ s decision rule is described at step 2. The regulator maximizes
expected social welfare conditional on the upstream and downstream decision rules.
While the regulator will ensure that the income requirement of an optimal number
of farms is met, the regulator will only induce the rival ￿rm to enter the market if
it has a marginal cost equal to or below the margin ￿
￿.
4 The information symmetry benchmark
When the government has all relevant information it can dictate the market outcome.
The quantity, x, should be processed as cheaply as possible. Also, the rival ￿rm￿ s
rent should be extracted, so as to reduce the socially costly transfer to the farmers.
Proposition 1 Under full information, the margin will be given by ￿
￿ = minfb;￿g.16
15Alternatively, the cooperative will restrict the number of members so that R1 (N) = 0 and
introduce marketable delivery rights. This is in accordance with the increasingly popular New
Generation Cooperative (NGC) model. See for example Harris, Stefanson and Fulton (1997) and
Nilsson (1997). Because our farms are indentical, they will choose to produce the same amount
under this system, irrespective of how the delivery rights are initially allocated.
16More precisely, when ￿ > b the access price should be set so that p ￿ ￿ < ￿. This condition
is satis￿ed by p ￿ ￿ = b.
10In the full information benchmark, the rival should be active if and only if it has
a cost advantage over the cooperative. Equal treatment of the cooperative and the
rival by means of an equal margin to cover the marginal re￿ning cost, ￿
￿ = b, yields
cost-e¢ cient production but a too high transfer, T, if the rival has a cost advantage.
In this sense Proposition 1 advocated discrimination against the rival. However, the
optimal policy can also be regarded non-discriminatory, since it involves letting the
most e¢ cient ￿rm do all the production and charging an access price that extracts
all surplus.
Note that the optimal margin ￿
￿ ensures cost-e¢ cient entry as well as zero rent
to the rival ￿rm. Also, since the terms of access result in cost-e¢ cient production,
the optimal price level will re￿ ect the most e¢ cient producer￿ s marginal cost:
Proposition 2 Under full information, the optimal quantity, x, will depend on the
downstream marginal cost of the active producer, and is determined by the familiar
Ramsey formula:







where ￿ = ￿@x
@p
p
x is the demand elasticity.
From Propositions 1 and 2 we have that competition between the two down-
stream producers may contribute to a lower price and a higher total quota. From
the welfare function we have that the optimal number of farms must satisfy
VN ￿ (1 + ￿)CN = 0:
As we vary x, this ￿rst order condition must hold as an identity. Since costs are




VNN ￿ (1 + ￿)CNN
> 0.
Since competition leads to an increase in x which in turn leads to an increase in N,
it should be is fair to say that also the interests of the farmers are best served by
exposing the cooperative to competition.
It should be noted that the optimal number of farms is determined by the optimal
output, and vice versa. Thus, these variables should be determined simultaneously.
11If the number of farms increases, for example due to a decrease in the ￿xed cost of
setting up a farm, the marginal cost of production, Cx, decreases. This gives rise to
a lower output price, or equivalently a higher total quota.17
Finally, note how a low social cost of public funds results in a high optimal
number of farms. When ￿ is close to 0, the optimal funding of farms involves a high
transfer and a competitive price.
5 Regulation under information asymmetry
We now consider the changes in optimal regulation that arise when the rival ￿rm is
privately informed about its marginal cost. In this setting the regulator will choose
a unique margin, ￿
￿, which is independent of the actual downstream marginal cost,
￿. Thus, the margin ￿
￿ can be interpreted as the rival￿ s cut-o⁄ type; that is, the










The regulator chooses ￿
￿, x, and T so as to maximize expected social welfare
(function arguments are suppressed for sake of clarity) given by




f(1 + ￿)(b ￿ ￿)x ￿ ￿￿gdF (￿);
subject to the rival￿ s individual rationality constraint ￿ ￿ 0.18 The ￿rst line in
(7) equals the expected social welfare if the cooperative is alone in the market. The
second line equals the change in expected welfare due to potential entry, and consists
of the social value of the expected cost reduction minus the social cost of the rival￿ s
expected rent.
A rational rival will produce if and only if its margin ￿
￿ covers its marginal costs
17It can be shown that convexity of C, concavity of V and concavity of [p(x)x] together with the
monotone hazard rate are su¢ cient conditions for the optimal solution to be uniquely characterized
by the ￿rst order conditions of the welfare maximization problem.
18Implicit in this choice set is an assumption that x is the same whether or not the rival becomes
active. This is mainly for expositional reasons ￿ if we had allowed x to depend on the active









Figure 1: Margins. First-best (FB) margins yield cost-e¢ cient production and no
rent to the rival. When uncertainty is introduced, the second-best (SB) margin is
unique and the rival earns an expected positive rent.
￿. Moreover, if it produces, it produces all. This means that expected welfare can
be written











f(1 + ￿)(b ￿ ￿)x ￿ ￿(￿
￿ ￿ ￿)xgdF(￿)
with no further constraints. The following two Propositions are now easily derived
from the ￿rst-order conditions of this maximization problem.
First, the optimal margin, ￿
￿, is independent of N and x, and is only in￿ uenced
by the trade-o⁄ between extracting the rival￿ s rent and achieving cost-e¢ cient pro-
duction.
Proposition 3 Under information asymmetry, the optimal margin is given by
￿








13The margin (or the cut-o⁄type) ￿
￿ is set so as to balance the expected social cost
of leaving a positive rent to the rival against the expected social cost of preventing
a cost-e¢ cient rival from being active. As in the full information case, the terms
of access should be set so as to discriminate against a cost-e¢ cient rival, that is
￿





and be excluded when ￿ 2 (￿
￿;b]. Consider the case in which the
rival has a marginal cost which is strictly lower than the cooperative￿ s marginal
cost, ￿ < b. In this case it would be optimal to let the independent ￿rm process
the whole quantity x. This is achieved, if ￿
￿ = b. The regulator can, however, do
better. Decreasing the margin somewhat, the socially costly transfers to the farms
are reduced at the cost of a small increase in the likelihood that a more e¢ cient
rival is prevented from entering the market. The regulator will decrease the margin
until these costs are equal on the margin. This trade-o⁄ is illustrated in ￿gure 1.
Under information asymmetry, the rival will earn a per unit pro￿t equal to the the
di⁄erence between the second-best and ￿rst-best margin. The regulator can extract
part of this pro￿t by setting a lower margin, but only at the cost of increasing the
probability that a more e¢ cient rival is cut o⁄.
Second, the optimal quantity, x, is determined by the adjusted Ramsey formula
given in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 Under information asymmetry, the optimal quantity, x, is deter-
mined by the following adjusted Ramsey formula















￿ ￿ ￿)dF(￿) is the expected social
marginal cost of downstream production.
The possibility of the rival￿ s entering the market lowers the price in two ways.
First, the expected marginal cost of downstream production, as seen from the farm-
ers￿and the cooperative￿ s perspectives, is reduced from b to a probability weighted
average of b and ￿
￿, that is, (1 ￿ F(￿
￿))b + F(￿
￿)￿









Figure 2: Prices. First-best (FB) Ramsey prices give optimal mixes of prices and
transfers. When uncertainty is introduced, the second-best (SB) Ramsey price will
be above the expected ￿rst-best price.
rent is positive, implying that the social marginal cost is even lower. Since an in-
crease in the rival￿ s expected mark-up results in an increase in the transfer to the
cooperative, the rival￿ s expected mark-up is discounted by the social cost of public
funds.
It is clear that the mere possibility of a more e¢ cient rival entering the market-
place brings the consumer price down relative to a situation in which the cooperative
faces no possible competition. The lower price is achieved by setting a higher up-
stream product quota which is optimally produced by a higher number of farms.
Thus, competition will bene￿t farmers, consumers and taxpayers.









which better re￿ ects the trade-o⁄ between rent-extraction and cost e¢ ciency. Set-
ting a high margin, ￿
￿, on one hand increases the rival￿ s expected rent and the
probability that a more e¢ cient rival will enter the market, but on the other hand
decreases the expected rent extraction and thus increases the need for a socially
costly transfer to the farms. The optimal margin is set so that these two e⁄ects
15balance on the margin. Consequently, when the margin is set at its optimal value,
the expected social marginal cost of downstream production, BD, is minimized and
the expected consumer price reaches its lowest value.
The price level and the degree of price discrimination against the rival depend
on the extent to which rent is more valuable in the cooperative than in the rival
￿rm. In our model this is modelled using the social cost of public funding, ￿.19 The
following Corollaries gives the implications of extreme values of ￿.
Corollary 1 If ￿ = 0, ￿






p dF(￿) < 0.
Corollary 1 says that ECPR should only be applied when the society attaches an
equal value to rent in the cooperative and rent in the rival ￿rm, for example due to
no e¢ ciency losses from taxation. In this case the price on the downstream product
should be set below the marginal costs of the farms and the cooperative.
Corollary 2 If ￿ ! 1, ￿
￿ solves ￿
￿ = b ￿
F(￿￿)
f(￿￿). Moreover,









The ￿rst part of Corollary 2 essentially says that for high values of ￿ ! 1,
the rival will be more severely discriminated against. This is intuitive, since the
social value of the rival￿ s rent is then much lower than of the cooperative￿ s (i.e.
the farmers￿ ) rent. The second part states that when ￿ ! 1, the farmers should
act as a monopolist. This will by de￿nition maximize market revenues and thereby
minimize the government transfers, which are extremely costly in this case.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have derived the optimal way of opening up the downstream activ-
ities of an agricultural cooperative for competition. We have shown that exposing
19It could also have been modelled by assuming that the regulator has access to limited budgets
for the agricultural sector, or simply by assuming that society care more about the cooperative
than the rival ￿rm (which is perhaps owned by foreigners).
16the monopoly cooperative to competition in a cautious way will bene￿t farmers,
consumers and tax payers. We have also shown that the optimal access price typi-
cally discriminates against the private rival because rent is socially more valuable in
the cooperative than in the private ￿rm, and the regulator therefore sacri￿ces some
cost e¢ ciency in order to shift rents.
The extent to which discrimination ought to be applied will depend on the social
cost of public funds, and will thus vary across time and countries. The social cost
of public funds is a⁄ected by the country￿ s institutions and macroeconomic charac-
teristics, and can be treated as exogenous to any regulated sector. La⁄ont (2005,
pp.1-2) suggests that ￿ may be approximately 0.3 in developed countries, and well
above 1 in less developed countries. Countries with a high funding cost should op-
timally support their farmers by using price support measures and limit the extent
of competition by setting a discriminatory access price. Countries with low funding
costs, should optimally choose to fund a high number of farms using direct transfers
and promote competition by setting a less discrimatory access price. This provides
an economic rationale for why EU CAP over time has changed focus from price
support to direct transfer support and why it has gradually opened up for com-
petition. However, as the eastern enlargement has resulted in more heterogeneity
accross member states, the CAP should perhaps open up for more country-speci￿c
policies.
As mentioned in the Introduction, the discriminatory access result hinges on the
assumption of imperfect competition among potential rivals ￿ with two or more
equally e¢ cient entrants, their rent is competed away and it is therefore no con￿ ict
between rent extraction and cost e¢ ciency. Perhaps it will be more realistic to
assume that the potential rivals have di⁄erent costs. Suppose there are n potential
rivals, each with private information about their individual marginal cost ￿i which
are independently drawn from the same distribution F(:) as before.20 First consider
an English auction for the right to be the only producer. We may for instance ask
the potential rivals to bid their required margins, promising to award the production
20The following reasoning is largely based on La⁄ont and Tirole (1987), who has an elaborate
analysis of the bene￿ts and costs of combining auctions with additional rent-extracting measures.
17contract to the one who bids the smallest margin. Let ￿(m) denote the m-th lowest of
the ￿i. Then standard auction theory logic leads to the conclusion that the ￿rm with
￿i = ￿(1) will outbid the others and win, and earn a per-unit rent of ￿(2) ￿ ￿(1). If
all rivals are equally e¢ cient, they will earn no rent. When the bidders are di⁄erent,
the auctioneer can typically do better, however. Then it can be shown that the
optimal auction involves awarding the production rights to the lowest bid as long as
this bid is not greater than ￿
￿, where ￿
￿ is as described in Proposition 3. With many
potential rivals, this mechanism will sometimes yield the same result as the simple
auction, it may lead to situations in which entry of a rival that is more e¢ cient
than the cooperative is blocked, and it may lead to situations in which an e¢ cient
rival produces but his rent is reduced. As before, ￿
￿ is set to balance the latter
two considerations. Moreover, also as before, the optimal mechanism discriminates
against the potential rivals.
Other assumptions may also be relaxed without fundamentally altering the con-
clusions in our paper. First, even if product di⁄erentiation increases the social value
of entry, discriminatory access pricing will still be optimal for reasonably close sub-
stitutes. For example, our model may be relevant for the medium-range value-added
markets of mostly undi⁄erentiated cheeses and fresh milk. According to Bekkum
and Nilsson (2000), these markets are the most likely to be heavily dominated by
domestic cooperatives also in the future. They argue that if the milk quota is abol-
ished, the higher value added markets of restricted size, such as deserts, specialized
cheeses, professional markets etc., will be dominated by investor-owned ￿rms. At
the bottom end of the market, such as milk powder and butter, it is likely that
international competition will be considerable. The world market parties will ￿nd it
di¢ cult to enter the medium-range value-added markets for cost reasons, whereas
investor-owned ￿rms will not be interested either.
Second, a quota abolition will not alter our conclusion that the terms of access
should be set so as to discriminate against the rival. Consider the EU dairy market.
Should the milk quota system be abolished, one would expect farmers to want
to increase their production. Under common arrangements of intake obligations,
cooperatives would have to buy an increasing volume of milk, which in turn would
18result in lower prices on dairy products.21 Alternatively, the cooperatives could
choose a value-added strategy where it restricts the milk intake by imposing a system
of delivery rights. Refering to our model, a price set below the optimal one, should
be met by an increase in transfer￿ and vice versa. More importantly, however, the
optimal margin ￿
￿ should not be altered. Thus, a decrease (increase) in price, p,
should be accommodated by an equal decrease (increase) in access price, ￿.
Finally, our model is motivated by an example from the agricultural sector.
The conclusions with respect to access pricing may, however, be applicable to other
settings in which the government wants to keep an activity under public control
while exposing part of it to competition.
21Ooms and Peerlings (2005) estimate that the EU dairy reforms will for Netherland result in
a decrease in milk price of 21 per cent and a decrease in dairy pro￿ts of 22 per cent. EU direct
payments will only compensate for roughly 53 per cent of this fall in pro￿t, according to their
model.
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